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Ciidan ciideeda kale Ilaahay bashbash iyo caafimaad Ilaahay ha inagu gaadhsiiyo

aamiin insh

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Madaxwynaha jamhuuriyadda Somaliland Axmed Maxamuud Siilaanyo oo la kulmay jaahliyadda Somaliland ee London

 

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Saado Cali Warsame oo lagu dilay Muqdisho

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Somaliland Genocide 1988 Canadian TV CBS

 

Publicerades den 19 jul 2014

Waa barnaamij uu TV-ga CBS ee Canada sii daayey 7-dii October 1992, oo ka hadlaya uu dambiyadii Somalia ka gaystay taliyaha cusub ee booliiska Somalia General Maxamed Xasan ismaaciil Faarax. Source: CBS Canada

 

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Daawo Video Sahra Halgan Iyo Boqashadi Somaliland Lifemakers

 

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nterview With Robert Wiren, Author Of “Somaliland Quarantined Country”

 

Christophe Boisbouvier

Somaliland is there a ghost state? Since the civil war of 1991, this country of four million people separated from Somalia, said its total independence and managed to protect the Shabaab Islamists. But despite his success, he is not recognized by any other state. Why the stigma? French journalist Robert Wiren published by Karthala Somaliland quarantined country. He is the guest of RFI.

RFI: Your colleague Gérard Prunier called Somaliland “the country that does not exist.”, You prefer to call it “the country in quarantine.” What for?

Robert Wiren: It does not exist in the eyes of some international diplomats are apparently blinded, but it actually exists. And when I say it is “quarantined”, that is to say, it is away from the international community, it is not recognized, it does not have access to a number aid international banks. But despite this weakness, it was able by itself to resolve its internal problems and to build a relatively peaceful state.

Somaliland is some four million inhabitants on a territory of Eritrea, some 135,000 square kilometers. And thanks to the breeding and its port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden is an economy that works without international help?

Yes I do. The export of live cattle to the Arabian Peninsula is the main market. Now, the other aspect is that it has an active diaspora in Dubai for example, in the United Kingdom.

Then the port of Berbera captures 20% of foreign trade of Ethiopia?

Yes, Ethiopians obviously have an interest in other ports as Djibouti has acquired a kind of monopoly in the wake of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. So the port of Berbera is a deepwater port that interests the Bolloré Group, which negotiations for some time with the Somaliland authorities, the problem is probably the non-recognition of that country which poses problems for insurance boats, which pay more when they dock in Berbera if they went to Djibouti.

In 1960 after the departure of the British colonialists, Somaliland has been independent for five days before joining the former Italian Somalia in Somali Republic. And that means today Somaliland is back its independence. But the African Union opposes. What for?

Africans in general do not like what they call secession because it is true that many African countries are fragile, multiethnic. In the case of Somaliland, in fact the word secession is not just because you could say that there was a union between two independent entities. The union did not work and they take their marbles.

In Africa, Somaliland has many opponents to their independence project, starting with their Somali brethren in Mogadishu course who want to rebuild Somalia Siad Barre time, but also Egypt. What for?

Egypt has always feared that Ethiopia becomes too strong and may eventually block the Nile.And Egypt has always sought to create a power to weight against Ethiopia. So Egypt continues to try to promote a new unified Somali Republic. All this is a bit of geopolitics shortsighted apparently.

What is less known is that in addition to Ethiopia, Somaliland has few friends on the African continent as the Malian Konaré. In 2005 when he chaired the Commission of the African Union, he asked the Rwandan diplomats Patrick Mazimpaka conduct a mission in Hargeisa. A mission that has a favorable self report of Somaliland?

Yes indeed. The mission recognized that there was a problem that was unique to recognize Somaliland and was not equivalent to open doors for secession in Africa.

It does not open a Pandora’s box, says Patrick Mazimpaka?

That’s it. Note that in the Horn of Africa, that is to say in the same region, there were two secessions Eritrea and South Sudan, so we see that the argument is a bit biased . Regarding favorable people within the African Union, you Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa. So they favor without going through not to create divisions within the African Union.

There are eighteen months, for the first time in twenty years, a Somali government in Mogadishu has been recognized by the United States, is that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud. If one day the Shabaab are defeated in southern Somalia, is that both Somaliland could not reunite?

Yes, we could imagine. There is a debate that could have taken place and which had been initiated by some scholars of Somalia, the building block process [process of gradual building] was let regions begin to administer independently develop; gradually, they can come together and create such a federation. But here, we do the opposite, as in Mogadishu you have people who are for centralization, in fact there is no risk of having a unit on these bases.

Interview by Christophe Boisbouvier

This interview was originally written in French, we translated to English from Google’s translator and read original article here

Source: RFI

 

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Somaliland has earned widespread respect for its relative peace and functional government.

A Changing Map: How ‘Small Wars’ Are Redrawing Africa’s Borders

From jihadists in violent quest of a Pax-Islamica or armed rebels carving up enclaves, the new violence is steadily loosening the control of states.

While southern Africa is enjoying an impressive long run of peace, other parts of the continent are increasingly threatened by an upsurge in “small wars”, and old borders and the unitary nation-state are under tremendous pressure from the new breed of insurgents.

Since 2000, there has been a sustained reduction in the number of large-scale armed conflicts. Many of the major guerilla movements like UNITA in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique – iconic of the classic era of big civil wars – died out through military conquest or peace treaties.

However, the eruption of fierce localized insurgencies across many parts of the continent in the last few years is fuelling renewed fears that it could be entering another period of instability.

From transnational jihadists in violent quest of a Pax-Islamica in the Sahel-Sahara and the Horn, to armed insurrectionists carving up enclaves in Nigeria, the Sinai and Mali, the new violence is steadily loosening the territorial and administrative control of states in North, West, Central and the Horn of Africa, and pose the greatest challenge to the stability of the continent.

Somalia, Somaliland, federalism
No other African country has been as radically altered by “small wars” as Somalia. In three decades, it has been transformed from a united and centralized state into a deeply fragmented nation, a patchwork of large and tiny sub-national entities and enclaves, autonomously administered by clans and the militant group, Al-Shabaab.

Somaliland, a northwestern province that was called British Somaliland in colonial times and which briefly forged a union with the rest of Somalia, broke off in 1991 following a popular referendum.

Its independence is contested by Mogadishu and not recognized internationally. The region, however, has earned widespread respect for its relative peace and functional government. That has however not made its quest for African recognition any less daunting.

Talks in the last four years between the Somaliland administration and the government in Mogadishu, facilitated by the UK, have eased old tensions, but have not brought them any closer to reaching an accord on the thorny issues of independence and unity. 

For a variety of reasons, not least the recent experience in South Sudan, the African Union (AU) is wary of supporting a process that may risk plunging another African country into a new large-scale conflict. 

Enter Al-Shabaab
The militant Al-Shabaab’s territorial control has diminished in the last three years as a result of military action by the 22,000-strong AU peacekeeping force, AMISOM, but the group still controls significant areas in south-central Somalia, which it administers tightly.

Throughout much of 2007-2008, the group used a combination of tact and pragmatism to co-administer areas under its control with clans in a bid to legitimize its rule. The move was cast as part of its grand Islamization project – a novel example of the Islamic shura (consultative) principle in action, designed to foster greater inclusivity in governance. Many of these co-administered regions were often called “Islamic emirates”.

However, Al-Shabaab’s philosophy of government was always centralist and monopolist. It actively worked to foil the emergence of parallel local authorities not subservient to it, and railed against federalism, which it portrayed as a foreign plot to dismember and weaken Somalia.

Its vision, as articulated by its hardline leader Ahmed Abdi-aw Godane, is one of a strong, centralized Somali state that forms the nucleus of a future Caliphate. Consequently, and not unlike other transnational jihadi groups, it does not recognize existing international borders.

Sudan and DRC
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are today two of Africa’s quintessential “small wars” states -plagued by endemic armed insurrections and periodic pogroms in their vast peripheries.

Most of the violence in Sudan is in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, but there are potential trouble spots in the east too, where a truce with local ethnic rebels remains tenuous and discontent is rife.

There also are growing suspicions that Sudan is getting sucked into the civil war in South Sudan and is supporting armed factions allied to the rebel leader Riek Machar.

Whatever its tactical or strategic calculations, it is hard to fathom how such support may change the game, and much less how a prolonged conflict in South Sudan could be in Khartoum’s objective long-term interest.

The regime’s renewed indiscriminate aerial bombardments in Kordufan, and in particular, the tactical use of lethal Syria-style “barrel bombs” suggest a serious escalation.

In DRC, the regime has been fighting a bewildering array of low-level insurgencies on multiple fronts in much of the east for many years, especially the Kivus.

Despite attempts by the Joseph Kabila government in Kinshasa to quell the rebellion through dialogue and military help from the UN peacekeeping mission, no breakthrough is in sight.

The actual functional territorial control of the regimes in power in Khartoum and Kinshasa has steadily diminished, with the proliferation of these localized insurgencies.

Geography and size partly compounds their inability to effectively counter local insurgencies, build state structures, improve local governance and provide basic services.

Source: The Mail & Guardian

 

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